Drone Attack on Iraq's Prime Minister

تاريخ الإضافة الإثنين 8 تشرين الثاني 2021 - 3:48 م    عدد الزيارات 1483    التعليقات 0

        

.....washington institute 

Muqawama Meltdown, Part 1: The Protest Strategy, Nov. 4-6, 2021

by Crispin Smith, Hamdi Malik, Michael Knights

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Crispin Smith is an associate at a Washington-based national security law group. His research focuses on Iraqi security, human rights, and law of armed conflict issues.

Dr. Hamdi Malik is an Associate Fellow with the Washington Institute, specializing in Shia militias. He is the co-founder of the Militia Spotlight platform, which offers in-depth analysis of developments related to the Iranian-backed militias in Iraq and Syria. He is the coauthor of the Institute's 2020 study "Honored, Not Contained: The Future of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces."

Michael Knights is the Boston-based Jill and Jay Bernstein Fellow of The Washington Institute, specializing in the military and security affairs of Iraq, Iran, and the Persian Gulf states.

Brief Analysis

Militias are feeling isolated: Before the Nov. 7 drone attack on Prime Minister Kadhimi, their first effort was an effort to deepen their sense of victim-hood and politically damage Kadhimi with protests.

The muqawama has been increasingly isolated over the last two weeks. First Asaib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) and Kataib Hezbollah's (KH's) Hoquq electoral efforts were dismal failures. Then Moqtada al-Sadr began to splinter away muqawama supporters like Badr and Nouri al-Maliki from KH and AAH. At the same time, the muqawama saw successful convictions of Kataib Hezbollah operators for the killing of protesters in Basra and the purging of muqawama officials from intelligence agencies. This isolation seems to have prompted a coordinated but hasty response by both KH and AAH. Part One of this series looks at protest activities, and Part Two at the Nov. 7 drone attack on Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi's house.

November 4: Rhetorical escalation

AAH and KH ramped up pre-protest rhetoric on Nov. 4. AAH leader Qais al-Khazali said in an interview with al-Ahd TV, that “the participants of the sit-in cannot return to their homes as losers”. He added AAH might boycott the parliament. Other AAH members went further: Abdulamir al-Teiban, an MP from Sadiqoun (AAH’s political wing), tweeted on November 4 “My advice to the Iraqi leaders who were removed from the arena of political decision-making by the US Embassy and the UAE, by means of elections… If you …turn a blind eye to this farce in exchange for fleeting benefits, your fate will be like the end of Muammar Gaddafi [the slain leader of Libya], whose head was torn off by uncontrolled gangs [operating] under French supervision”.

November 5: Protest initiation

On November 5, a Friday, muqawama supporters advanced on the International Zone, throwing stones at security forces, who unleashed tear gas and fired live rounds into the air. According to Reuters, hospital sources said that more than 21 protesters were hurt mostly from smoke inhalation and nine policeman injured from being pelted by stones. At least one recorded fatality occurred. The muqawama made a huge deal of the clash, which was fairly small by Iraqi protest standards, underlining their focus on shaping the perception of reality, more than reality itself.

Militia Spotlight observed intense, pre-prepared media activity across the muqawama media channels, especially KH and AAH channels, which shared videos and photographs of the protests, including images of wounded protestors. Throughout, Badr affiliated platforms such as Munasat Baa remained largely silent regarding the protests, suggesting a lack of interest or support from the Badr side of the Fatah political bloc.

From approximately 17.16 hrs (Baghdad time), a statement by the newly formed “Preparatory Committee for the Demonstrations Rejecting the Election Results in Baghdad and the Governorates” (al-lajnat al-tahdiriya lil-tazhahirat al-rafida li-nata’ij al-intikhabat fi Baghdad wal-muhafizhat) was republished by Sabereen News, followed by various AAH and KH Telegram channels. The statement reiterated the claims of election fraud and called for holding Prime Minister Kadhimi, along with Abdul Wahab al-Saadi and Hamid al-Zuhairi “directly responsible for the killing and wounding of dozens of martyrs.” (Intelligence official Abu Ragheef and the Deputy Chief of Staff Abdalamir al-Shammari were also targeted with threats). Muqawama information operations sought to create a wave of support for the criminal indictment of such figures and the effective end of Kadhimi's bid for reappointment. (On the next day, such graphics had been mass produced on billboards for protestors to carry.)

By 23.00 hrs (Baghdad), AAH’s Qais al-Khazali arrived at the site of the protests where he stated that “we will hold the aggressors against peaceful protestors legally accountable.” He also directly threatened Kadhimi: "My message to Kadhimi himself is this: the blood of these martyrs from your response with live ammunition... your response in this manner shows that you are the main figure behind the [election] fraud... To Kadhimi and whoever stands with Kadhimi and anyone who participated in this crime…, [revenge] for the blood of the martyrs [will be achieved] by trying you. We never abandoned [our revenge for] the blood Abu Mahdi and Hajj Qasem... our response reached each and every American base… You Kadhimi, hear it from [me], [revenge for] the blood of the martyrs is in our responsibility [which will be achieved by trying you... and anyone who took part in firing [at the protesters].” The next day, a major KH media Telegram outlet, Unit 10000, released lists of security force names alleged to be responsible for killings by the security forces, with the comment “this time we only publish your names, next time it will be your address, picture, and even weapon serial number.”

November 6: Sit-in and generation of sympathy

Muqawama supporters held further protests in Baghdad on Saturday, this time as a sit-in to “offer condolences for the martyrs of the crimes of the government.” The sit-in was attended by a who’s who of militia leaders. The leaders seated in the senior leaders’ tent included Abu Hussein al-Hamidawi (KH’s secretary general, who was able to attend with the assistance of a walking stick); Mohamad Mohi (KH Spokesman); Hussein Moanes (KH’s Haqouq party leader, aka Abu Ali al-Askari); Abu Ala al-Walai the secretary general of KSS; Qais al-Khazali of AAH; and Hadi al-Ameri of Badr. KH’s Abu Fadak (operational head of the PMF) and Kataib Imam al-Ali leader Shibl al-Zaidi also attended. (On November 7, a funeral and wake was held for the dead rioter, with the above leaders mainly attending).

The November 4-6 sequence show KH and AAH working together in a rapid and integrated manner, blending their propaganda networks, to signal that they will not be isolated and that (in this effort) they have similar interests. Part of this message was no doubt targeted on muqawama politicians who may be exploring paths of accommodation with Moqtada al-Sadr, such as Hadi al-Ameri and Nouri al-Maliki. Such leaders were forced back into the muqawama's tent ..

In the next part of this two-part series, Militia Spotlight will look at the abrupt (and probably, from the muqawama perspective, counter-productive) drone attacks launched on Kadhimi's house on November 7.

Muqawama Meltdown, Part 2: Drone Attack on Iraq's Prime Minister, Nov. 7, 2021

by Crispin Smith, Michael Knights, Hamdi Malik

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Crispin Smith is an associate at a Washington-based national security law group. His research focuses on Iraqi security, human rights, and law of armed conflict issues.

Michael Knights is the Boston-based Jill and Jay Bernstein Fellow of The Washington Institute, specializing in the military and security affairs of Iraq, Iran, and the Persian Gulf states.

Dr. Hamdi Malik is an Associate Fellow with the Washington Institute, specializing in Shia militias. He is the co-founder of the Militia Spotlight platform, which offers in-depth analysis of developments related to the Iranian-backed militias in Iraq and Syria. He is the coauthor of the Institute's 2020 study "Honored, Not Contained: The Future of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces."

Brief Analysis

The muqawama followed up Qais al-Khazali's threat to Kadhimi with a real-world drone attack on his house, seemingly shattering the narrative of victim-hood the militias had been building.

In Part One of this two-parter, Militia Spotlight reviewed the rapid, integrated effort by Asaib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) and Kataib Hezbollah (KH) to respond to their growing political isolation by launching protests against the government center, attempting to draw security forces into harming protestors. AAH and KH then mounted an energetic information operations effort to undermine Prime Minister Mustafa Kadhimi and his key military leaders, while also forcing other muqawama leaders to turn away from their negotiations to join a new government without AAH and KH.

On November 5, AAH leader Qais al-Khazali had threatened Kadhimi personally, saying: " You Kadhimi, hear it from [me], [revenge for] the blood of the martyrs is in our responsibility [which will be achieved by trying you... and anyone who took part in firing [at the protesters].” Yet the first action taken against Kadhimi was anything but legal: early on November 7, two explosive-laden quadcopter drones struck the residence of PM Kadhimi, causing structural damage but failing to injure Kadhimi.

Muqawama denial of a real drone attack.

At approximately 02.30 hrs (Baghdad) on November 7, media channels affiliated with Kataib Hezbollah broke the news of explosions and gunfire in the International Zone of Baghdad, sparking speculation in the muqawama channels about a potential coup. The muqawama media channels quickly began developing a line of argument that portrayed the attacks as a false-flag operation, claiming that Western intelligence agencies or Kadhimi's team had faked the drone attack. Unhelpfully playing into this narrative, Iraq's Joint Operations Command queried why the U.S.defensive system (installed for protection of the U.S. Embassy) did not fire in order to protect the Prime Minister if there had been a drone strike. (U.S. defenses are unlikely to interfere so far out from the embassy and so close to rooftop level).

At 04.17 hrs (Baghdad) on November 7, KH’s Abu Ali al-Askari posted a statement claiming that “no Iraqi would desire to expend a drone on the house of the former Prime Minister [sic]”, going on to note that if anyone did wish to do so, there would be “many less expensive ways to achieve that.” At 09.54 hrs (Baghdad) on November 7, AAH leader Qais al-Khazali echoed the false-flag narrative, noting that any perpetrators should be investigated as [the explosion] was "an attempt to shuffle the papers [i.e. muddy the waters] just one day after the clear crime of murdering protesters and assaulting them and burning their tents."

Quadcopters used in the attack

The drones used in the Nov. 7 attack were short-range quadcopter systems of a kind that has been seen periodically since July 2020.

July 23, 2020. A quadcopter was discovered on a rooftop in Jadriya, Baghdad, across the Tigris River from the U.S. Embassy. It was carrying a munition that closely matched the type found (unexploded) on the roof of Kadhimi's house on November 7 (see Figure 2, right-hand side).

March 4, 2021. A quadcopter similar to the July 23 find was used in an attempted overflight on a Kurdish leadership compound in Erbil during a period of tension between Iran-backed muqawama elements and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) over Kurdish pre-negotiation with Moqtada al-Sadr. A second quadcopter sighting was reported at Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa Kadhimi's house the same night, probably reflecting muqawama disquiet with Sadr-Kadhimi-KDP pre-election talks.

July 5, 2021, A further nearly identical quadcopter to the July 23, 2020 and July 2, 2021 finds was also discovered was shot down by U.S. defenses in Baghdad.

Militia Spotlight assesses that the quadcopters used against Kadhimi on November 7, 2021 were probably operated by the same user that undertook the previous attacks. Technical features (see Figure 3) of the drones (appearance, high-quality battery management system, 3D-printed battery case, telemetry system, signature cabling) suggest a talented engineering team involved in attacks on muqawama adversaries in Iraq.

Political fallout

The muqawama has not presented a unified face on the issue of the drone attack. Badr and Nouri al-Maliki condemned the attack as a real assault on the premier. Badr leader Hadi al-Ameri noted: "We strongly condemn the targeting that happened last night at the home of the honorable [muhtaram] Prime Minister. We call upon the competent authorities to investigate the matter, verify the facts, uncover who is behind it, and hold him accountable, whoever he is. We warn that a third party is behind the incident in order to mix the papers [muddy the waters] and create fitna [unrest/sedition]." Though al-Ameri is still hedging, he is clearly not going as far as KH or AAH. If Qais al-Khazali and KH sought to push all muqawama elements back together using their protest gambit on Nov. 4-6, yet the drone attack has undermined this objective, potentially potentially leaving AAH and KH even more isolated, while Kadhimi has received strong international rhetorical support following the drone attack. This may be a further indicator of political tone-deafness in KH or AAH or both.

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